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ACCORDING TO testimony last month (March), FBI agent Harry Samit warned his supervisors dozens of times that Zacarias Moussaoui was an al-Qaeda terrorist, and that he suspected he may be planning an attack or a hijacking involving airplanes. According to the Washington Post (link broken), Samit wrote that he was "so desperate to get into Moussaoui's computer I'll take anything," the day before the Sept. 11 attacks.  But Samit's warning was not even close to the only one.

Whether the agency was on the ball or not, attention to the larger threat that we faced had to come from the top down in order to ensure linking what were well connected dots.

Connect the dots above, where at least some agents were repeatedly arguing, "we have to look at this," in an atmosphere where our intelligence agences, instead, had been properly and routinely briefed top down from outside. Then, connect the fact that they were not, with these glaring dots.  Directed towards the President, National Security Advisor, and other Administration principals, they indicated a clear and pressing need for such attention. Yet such attention -- in stark contrast to the clear need -- was not remotely given. See here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.

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