THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
Is the "war on terror" really a war, or is this just a term of art? If it is an
official war, what will mark its end?
Since we may be required to thwart international terrorism for decades to come,
is this something that should be used as a rationale to expand the reach and
scope of the Executive Branch of Government, under the auspices of "war time
powers"?
Yet these questions are not even being asked, in part because the "war on
terror," is constantly being confused with the so called "war in Iraq." But the
war in Iraq is not the war on terror.
As the
9/11 Commission and Senate Intelligence Committee reports both concluded,
Iraq was not connected to the attacks of September 11. Prior to our military
effort there, it was also largely unconnected to radical Islamic extremism, the
wellspring of the anti-Western international terrorism movement.
Iraq, however, is related to the war on terror: If achievable, a well
functioning Iraqi democracy might serve as a step toward reducing the impact of
just such extremism. Some international terrorists may have made their way in
since the start of the action to try and undermine that goal, as well. And, if
Iraq stumbles into long term civil war, it could potentially turn into a
breeding ground for terrorism if radical factions further emerge or take root.
We have also focused heavily on the country, and the action there has more
clearly definable parameters than the war on terrorism in general.
Because of these many considerations, we hear almost constantly not only of the
"war in Iraq," but even more commonly, of the action there itself as "the war,"
when, clearly, it is not the war on terror, but merely one aspect of it.
Yet if the war nevertheless is in fact "with Iraq," what does this have to do
with the President's clandestine expansion of the Executive Branch's unchecked
powers
-- in
direct contravention of previously existing statute --
in order to spy without warrant on U.S. citizens to thwart potential
international terrorist activity? And, what does this spying have to do with
protecting the nascent Iraqi government or our soldiers over there?
On the other hand, if the war being referred to, despite constant casual
references to Iraq as "the war," is in fact in this instance the broader "war on
terror," what will mark its end so that it is no longer used as an excuse for
the alleged "war powers" expansion of the reach and scope of the Executive
branch and of the federal government in general?
There have been almost no answers given to these questions, mainly because we
have not asked them. And we can not even begin to ask them, if we continue to
fool ourselves into thinking that the "war" in Iraq is in fact a substitute for
the broader "war on terror," or if we sloppily continue to use the two
interchangeably simply when convenient or to avoid the questions that matter,
and in rare instances to distinguish between the two when it is not.
Whether a term of art or an actual "war," the war on terror is not with Iraq or
with the insurgency there, but with international terrorism. But this needs to
be clearly recognized, and properly defined, before we can figure out the more
critical questions of what we should do in fighting it -- both in terms of
keeping America strong here at home by upholding the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, and in terms of thwarting and eradicating the movement abroad.
Preventing, and eliminating, international terrorism consists of three main
parts: Capturing or eliminating terrorists, including first and foremost all
those connected with the brutal attacks of September 11, and ongoing and
improved intelligence ops
(which does not require a warrantless requirement to spy on U.S. citizens, let
alone one arrived at
clandestinely and in
contravention
of previously existing law);
securing our borders as well as all unsecured fissile and WMD capable biological
materials; and reducing the impact and spread of fanatical anti-Western Islamic
extremism. How to most effectively accomplish these involves a whole
new set of critical challenges.
Whether the Iraq action mitigated or worsened these challenges can be debated ad
nauseum. The only relevant inquiry there now is whether our presence can reduce
the insurgency, and if so, how to most effectively accomplish this already. But
let's start focusing on the bigger picture, and start asking the right
questions. Until we do that, we certainly aren't going to get the right
answers. And, frankly, the stakes are far too high not to.